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The use of U.S. DoD medical assets in International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
Operations (IH/DRO) has been extensive in the past and has grown markedly since the end
of the Cold War. It is important that DoD personnel understand the complex interagency
coordination and political ramifications of their participation in IH/DRO. This thesis
examines the history, current planning, interagency coordination, law, DoD doctrine, and
budgeting issues affecting the use of DoD medical assets for IH/DRO. To research the
current state ofIH/DRO execution by the DoD, Federal laws, DoD doctrine, professional
journals, and current periodicals were reviewed. Additionally, interviews were conducted
with personnel in OSD, USCENTCOM, and the DoD medical community to obtain insight
from recent participants in IH/DRO. Research indicated that three levels of control,
coordination, and planning exist within the U.S. government to conduct IH/DRO. The
strategic level consists ofthe U.S. Congress, the NCA, USAID, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The operational level consists of the Unified Combatant Commands, who conduct
contingency planning for their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). Finally, the tactical level
consists of the Joint Task Force (JTF) stood up by the Unified Combatant Command to
execute the operation. Doctrine to execute these operations is lacking and acknowledged by
DoD Doctrine Commands, who are working to address this shortcoming. The current
command and coordinating structure documented in this thesis is in a dynamic state of
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Assisting populations affected by disasters of natural
or human origin is important for the maintenance of peace,
security, and stability in today's world. According to
national security policy, emergency humanitarian
assistance 1 will be an essential capability of U.S. forces
in the 21st century. [Ref.l:p.l4]
The end of the cold war has triggered a discussion about
the opportunity for new roles and missions for the
Department of Defense. With the end of the Soviet empire,
our geopolitical compass has lost its magnetic north. The
inability of developing nations to cope with disasters
and the rising tides of ethnic chaos provide a partial
substitute. [Ref.2:p.46] U.S. military involvement in
International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations
(IH/DRO) now known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has
been extensive in the past and has grown markedly since the
end of the Cold War. We have participated bilaterally with
the United Nations and unilaterally in many of these
operations in the past. The Nicaraguan earthquake in 1972
1 Humanitarian Assistance is defined by DODD 5 1 1 1 . 1 as any activity, issue, program,
situation, or other function with a humanitarian component. Humanitarian assistance includes, but
is not limited to: worldwide humanitarian assistance; foreign disaster relief; humanitarian
demining; humanitarian intervention; humanitarian and civic assistance; law of war; provision
of humanitarian excess property; migration emergencies; refugee assistance; and space available
or other transportation of privately donated humanitarian relief.
1
and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh in 1994 are good
examples of purely Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
that were very successful using DOD medical assets.
What is evident in this new world order is the
massive increase in international emergencies requiring DOD
medical assets. Between 1978 and 1985 an average of five
emergencies a year occurred. In 1994 alone there were
twenty. By 2025 the population in the world's least-
developed countries is projected to increase 143 percent
from 1990 population figures. These countries will have
nearly two times the displaced people that wealthy
countries will have. Demographic trends suggest an
increase in instability, with the poorest countries finding
their scarce resources unable to provide medical care to
their population. [Ref.3:p.3] Civilian decision makers
repeatedly turn to the U.S. military to create solutions
for international crises. Simply put, because no other
U.S. agency is comparably equipped, manned, managed, or
funded, the U.S. military must be prepared for these
missions. The DOD possesses the unique rapid response
capability, sea-based forces and logistical requirements to
meet challenges of getting medical supplies and personnel
to disaster sites faster than any other organization in the
world.
2
The U.S. global security strategy is changing and
U.S. strategic interests are being defined more broadly
than ever, which includes not only a desire to foster
democracy, but to secure peace, human rights, and relief
from suffering. This will require an increasing use of
U.S. military medical assets in the future to meet our
expanding role. Since the Department of Defense will bear
the brunt of these efforts, we must review our current
planning, coordination of assets, and budgeting efforts in
IH/DRO. Can we do it better? And most important, can the
job be done more cheaply and with fewer assets in a right
sizing U.S. military?
These missions are expensive. Right now DOD is
picking up most of the costs. Since FY 1992, the DOD has
reported more than $7 billion in incremental costs for its
participation in contingency operations that include
IH/DRO. [Ref.4:p.3] There is a $2.2 billion shortfall in
unfunded contingency operations in FY 1996, mostly from
Bosnia [Ref.5]. The Administration plans to submit a second
reprogramming to cover the shortfall. Planning and
budgeting for increasingly costly contingency operations
will require better cost accounting procedures. The GAO
states that the DOD does a poor job of reporting
3
incremental costs of these operations because of a material
weakness in DOD accounting systems. [Ref.4:p.4] Finally, in
regards to funding, the DOD must maximize the use of
scarce resources, because the job will not go away even if
we are not properly funded for Humanitarian/Disaster Relief
contingencies
.
This is a topic that warrants further study and
could be useful to planners in the U.S. military and other
nations interested in utilizing military medical assets in
Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations abroad.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS
The thesis will begin with a brief summary of our
capabilities and the existing political and world climate
that allows the use of DOD medical assets for International
Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations. It is important to
note that in peacekeeping operations, such as in Bosnia,
U.S. DOD personnel will operate in UN hospitals such as the
one in Zagreb, Croatia. Although the hospital has treated
a large number of civilians, its primary purpose is to care
for UN forces. This could be constituted as humanitarian
assistance, depending on the definition. I will review
this particular operation in Zagreb which is humanitarian
assistance in conjunction with a peacekeeping operation.
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However, this thesis will primarily focus on IH/DRO as a
unilateral commitment of the U.S. DOD to the host country.
DOD Instructions identify two mandated types of IH/DRO
for utilizing medical assets. They are the Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation
and the Humanitarian Civic Assistance Program. I will
examine the historical role the DOD has played in these two
OOTW. The topics will be identified through an extensive
literature search of professional journals, military
publications and current periodicals. Current planning and
executions of these operations will be thoroughly examined
at the Unified Command level through interviews with
military members on planning staffs and members who have
recently participated in humanitarian missions that
required DOD medical personnel from U.S. Central Command.
I will contact other government organizations to study
their interrelationship with the DOD in coordinating the
use of medical assets for disaster relief. An example
would be the State Department and the U.S. Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) which is part of United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)
.
USAID's chairman is the President's coordinator for all
U.S. government international disaster relief.
C. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is this: What is the
current structure for planning, coordinating and budgeting
for IH/DRO and the use of DOD medical assets in these
operations? The current structure for the planning,
coordinating and budgeting for these operations is a
tangled web of interrelationships between government
organizations inside and outside of the DOD. I will
document these relationships to identify how we conduct
these operations from project identification to completion
D. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following questions are addressed and answered in
support of the primary research question. Each question
will be answered in one of the five chapters of this
thesis
.
1. What IH/DRO have we conducted in the past utilizing
DOD medical assets and what were the results?
2. What are the current federal laws, military doctrine,
and interrelationships between Government agencies
that coordinate and execute IH/DRO involving DOD
medical assets?
3. How do we plan and execute these contingencies that
require medical assets at the Unified Command Level
(CENTCOM) and how much does it cost?
4
.
What trends do we see for the use of military medical
assets for IH/DRO?
E. CHAPTER CONTENTS
Chapter II will provide the historical background and
political implications of these OOTW operations. I will
review the growing role and capabilities for DOD with
respect to these operations.
Chapter III reviews the current legal authority for
use of DOD medical assets abroad for humanitarian and
disaster assistance. It should be noted that medical
assets constitute only one segment of the many DOD
capabilities employed to conduct International Humanitarian
and Disaster Relief Operations. To understand how and when
medical assets are utilized it is necessary to understand
the legal authority and coordination of IH/DRO as a whole.
Current JCS and service doctrine will be examined to
indicate how we are expected to carry out these
operations. The interrelationships between the DOD
commands that carry out these missions, OSD departments and
other involved government agencies will be identified and
explained, with particular emphasis upon the medical
component
.
Chapter IV is an analysis of the two distinct types
of IH/DRO outlined in JCS Pub 3-07. I have contacted two
individuals at U.S. CENTCOM who have been involved in
planning, and have actual field experience in the use of
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DOD medical assets in International Humanitarian and
Disaster Relief Operations. One is operation "SEA SIGNAL"
which was a large-scale purely humanitarian operation.
These types of operations are funded mainly by the Joint
Task Force which in turn utilizes the Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation
that allows CINCs to fund major disasters on short notice.
The other operation, "EAGER TIGER," is typical of a
small scale Humanitarian Civic Assistance program
operation. The HCA program is funded by O&M funds that are
budgeted and maintained by the CINCs. The data collected
will answer the question of this chapter.
Chapter V will be divided into sections A, B, and C.
Section A will be an overview of what was found in the
research that answers the primary thesis question.
Section B will summarize the subsidiary research questions
based on research presented in previous chapters.
Recommendations for further research will be presented in
section C.
II. IH/DRO HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. BACKGROUND
The U.S. military has a long tradition of providing
emergency humanitarian relief and disaster assistance at
home and abroad. U.S. forces provided medical services and
supplies to thousands of refugees and displaced persons
following earthquakes in Peru (1970) and Nicaragua ( 1972)
,
flooding in Sudan(1988), volcanic eruption in the
Philippines (1990) , and tropical cyclones in East
Bengal (1970) , Sri Lanka(1978) / and Bangladesh ( 1991 ) . [Ref.
6:p.386]
The DoD has been conducting IH/DRO for many years.
Since the end of the cold war, the increased number, cost,
and complexity of these IH/DRO has stirred debate. During
the cold war era IH/DRO were justified in order to help
allies or to influence non-aligned countries into the
sphere of democracy. As the new world order develops,
humanitarian assistance is playing a larger role in
American military strategy. In regards to IH/DRO, the
current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen John
Shalikashvili stated, "military forces can do a great deal
of good because they bring with them an organization and
structure that no civilian organization can match"
9
[Ref .6:p.387] . The U.S. military is the only
organization in the world able to carry out independent,
large-scale relief operations worldwide.
Why should we become involved in IH/DRO that involve
DoD medical personnel? We do incur risk of harm to our
people, as in Somalia, and large financial burdens to the
U.S. taxpayer. On an emotional level one could say that it
is morally "the right thing to do," adhering to Judeo-
Christian ethics. President Clinton has stated, "U.S.
foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principle
most Americans share" [Ref.2:p48]. It could be said that
dollars spent on IH/DRO are small compared to offsetting
future regional conflicts. We can and have used IH/DRO
to keep the world' s developing nations in the international
fold. This is a stated policy of U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) [Ref. 7].
The remainder of this chapter will review the
historical aspects of this tradition. I will present
a number of examples which show the diversity of types of
missions in which medical assets are utilized in IH/DRO. I
will then identify and assess our capabilities and
limitations associated with IH/DRO. To close chapter II, I
will review budgetary trends which tie in closely with the
current tempo of IH/DRO.
10
B. PAST MISSIONS INVOLVING DOD MEDICAL ASSETS
1. 1972 Nicaraguan Earthquake
a. Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
The 1972 Nicaraguan earthquake is a good example
of the type of operation that would now utilize the
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
appropriation due to its purely humanitarian nature. The
OHDACA will be explained further in Part D of this chapter.
Jb. Synopsis of Mission
U.S. Southern Command received word at 0400 on 23
December 1972 of the earthquake. Military assistance
was requested due to the enormous destruction in the
capital city of Managua. The need for medical assistance
was especially critical. In addition to the available
medical assets within the Canal Zone, two field hospitals
were sent from CONUS. They were the Air Force 1st Tactical
Hospital from MacDill AFB and the U.S. Army's 21st
Evacuation Hospital from Fort Hood, Texas. Within
a few hours of this disaster, an impressive amount of
medical capability was organized as part of a joint U.S.
disaster relief effort.
An assessment of medical needs was performed
within 13 hours of the disaster by an Army medical team of
11
nine physicians, a Medical Service Corps Officer, and
eighteen medical corpsman. This team performed the
function of the currently utilized Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) . The DART will be reviewed more
thoroughly in Chapter III.
Within 72 hours of the earthquake units began
arriving. A functioning surgical service was expeditiously
established and an infectious disease surveillance system
was implemented. In the early days of the disaster this
task force assumed the major burden of care for the sick
and wounded. Countless thousands were saved by our medical
personnel. The Joint Task Force left three functioning
hospitals in Nicaragua when they departed. [Ref . 8 :pp. 50-51
]
2. United Nations Hospital Zagreb, Croatia
a. Human! tarIan Assistance vith Peacekeeping
This operation is an example of the utilization
of DOD medical assets in conjunction with a peacekeeping
operation. The primary use of the hospital was to care
for the UN Forces, but due to the substantial number of
civilians treated, it warrants review as a humanitarian
mission. The costs incurred with any incidental
humanitarian assistance provided are paid for out of the
contingency fund utilized to pay for the peacekeeping
12
operation itself. It is therefore almost an impossible
task to determine exactly how much the DoD spends on
humanitarian relief. This is due to humanitarian relief
being provided collaterally in other operations in addition
to the Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) program and the
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
appropriation.
b. Synopsis of Mission
In November 1992 an advance team of medical and
support personnel from the 212th Mobile (U.S.) Army Surgical
Hospital (MASH) arrived in Zagreb from Germany to care
for UN peacekeepers. They were subsequently relieved in
succession by the 502nd MASH six months later, U.S. Air
Force 48th Medical Group Hospital in Sept 1993, U.S. Navy's
Fleet Hospital Six in March 1994, and U.S. Navy Fleet
Hospital Five in Sept 1994. This operation is currently
manned by an Air Force contingent From Travis AFB.
They have had plenty to do, handling almost
20,000 outpatients and performing over 350 major
operations. These statistics are made up of UN Forces and
civilians. On a purely humanitarian mission originating
from the Zagreb hospital, Fleet Hospital Five received a
one-time approval from Washington to go 120 km southwest of
Zagreb to care for refugees in the so called Bihac pocket.
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The team treated a wide variety of conditions from that of
a 58-year-old woman who stepped on a land mine to a large
number of pediatric problems, particularly dehydration.
The team noted other medical units from Denmark, Jordan,
Poland, and Ukraine were there to help refugees. In 12
days the team saw 1500 patients. They noted the importance
of having a good interpreter and their own medical
equipment
.
Fleet Hospital Five, like its predecessors, used
telemedicine to good effect. They transmitted x-ray photos
or roentgenogram and computed tomography scans to the Naval
Medical Center, San Diego, CA. Using telemedicine
increases the expertise on site without the need for
sophisticated equipment or personnel. The hospital also
cooperates with the local Croatian community, and the
nearby University of Zagreb Medical School to help
indigenous capability. [Ref.9]
3. USECOM MEDFLAG OPERATIONS
a. Humanitarian Civic Assistance Program (HCA)
Members of DoD medical teams have been working
with and training foreign military members in developing
medical capability and disaster preparedness. Within Africa
14
this training is accomplished through USECOM' s MEDFLAG
Operations 2 .
Operations of the MEDFLAG type have had different
program names over the years. In the Vietnam era, programs
of this type were called Military Civic Action (MCA) , and
more recently Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) . These
different programs refer to the same objectives outlined in
JCS Pub 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War. These
programs are provided under Title 10 U.S. Code Section 401
and must fulfill unit training requirements that
incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local
populace [Ref . 11 :p. 111-10] . They are funded and carried
out by the Unified Commands under various operation names.
Humanitarian Civic Assistance and Military Civic
Action has its roots in the beginning of the Cold War.
We must distinguish HCA as a strategic tool from other
forms of IH/DRO. The first formal MCA plan was the Armed
Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. In 1959
Congress funded the Draper Committee to study the
usefulness of Military Civic Action. The Committee
recommended, "As a matter of policy we encourage the use of
the armed forces of underdeveloped countries as a major
'transmission belt' of socioeconomic reform and
2 The origin of the name MEDFLAG is believed to represent a showing of the U.S. flag
through medical assistance.
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development." This early HCA type program was successful
in the Philippines and Vietnam. [Ref . 12 :p. 363]
Jb. Synopsis of Mission
MEDFLAG operations are medical HCA operations
planned, funded, and carried out by USECOM in various
locations in Africa. The major objective of this medical
HCA operation and other HCA operations is to conduct
combined training with the host nation's military
personnel. It should be noted that portions of Africa fall
in USECOM' s Area Of Responsibility or AOR.
MEDFLAG MOKOLO 88, a joint U.S. Army and Air
Force medical exercise, was conducted with a medical
battalion of the Republic of Cameroon to simulate a
volcanic disaster. In Botswana, in 1988, the scenario was
a mine explosion. In 1990, in Mauritania, training
centered on an airplane crash. [Ref. 8:p.49]
MEDFLAG 94 was operational 16 to 25 April 1994 in
Ghana. Training was held in mass casualty, dental
preventive medicine, optometry, disease threats, food and
water precautions and the importance of malaria
chemoprophylaxis . One of the benefits to our medical
personnel during this operation and all other MEDFLAG
operations is getting experience in dealing with the
problems of deployment in a remote area. The 80 member
16
U.S. team consisted of three elements of USECOM: 212th
MASH, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit no. 7
and USAREUR Dental and Optometry Teams. This operation
also utilized the services of one Dutch and one German
medical officer.
They trained over 100 Ghanaian civilian and
military medical personnel which will in turn provide
training for their Ghanaian colleagues. Over 4000 patients
were seen. This HCA funded operation provided over 3000
children with yellow fever immunization. Approximately 30
tons of medical consumables were donated to the Ghanian
government through USECOM' s HCA program. [Ref.10]
Each Unified Command has programs of this nature conducting
similar operations but utilizing different operation names.
Col George A. Luz, MSC, USAR and Col John W.
Depauw, CA, USAR both of the Office of the Chief, U.S. Army
Reserve, Pentagon, have conducted research in the area of
IH/DRO. They have brought together people who are critical
of and support MCA, including medical MCA. By studying
past operations, this group sought to develop a set of
guidelines where MCA could be used to defend against
current threats, relevant to our defined strategic interest
[Ref .12:p.363]
.
Col Joel C. Gaydos, MC, USA of the Department
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of Preventive Medicine and Biometrics, Uniformed Services
University of Health Sciences, has conducted extensive
research in the area of MCA as well. LTC John T. Little, a
military advisor in Laos, established twelve requirements
for success in MCA. COL. Gaydos has taken the work of LTC
Little and combined it with the work of DePauw and Luz.
COL. Gaydos developed a set of criteria that could be used
by current HCA project planners on Unified Command Staffs
to plan, execute and evaluate the potential success of
projects. HCA coordinators at the Unified Commands must
submit a list of annual planned projects for DCINC approval
before executing. These criteria, developed by COL.
Gaydos, are provided in Table 2-1.
C. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF DOD MEDICAL ASSETS
The U.S. DOD is a large, well trained, and highly
organized force that is designed for operations that
require rapid mobilization and support. This definition
sounds like an organization that is ready made to handle
IH/DRO. However, the primary mission of the DOD is warfare,
not IH/DRO. It would be useful to review the capabilities
and limitations of using the DOD medical assets in IH/DRO.
1 . Capabilities
The ability to impose security is probably the most
18
MCA CRITERIA
1 Projects must fulfill perceived needs of the people,
and at least be accepted by their government and their
military.
2 Projects must have meaningful, feasible, beginning and
ending dates, must be completed on time, and must
demonstrate that the U.S. Forces involved are
competent, capable, and can be trusted.
3 U.S. teams must be staffed with people who have
technical and administrative expertise and the
interest and desire to successfully complete the
project
.
4 The indigenous population must be willing to share the
workload and make sacrifices for the project.
5 The indigenous people/or their military must be
capable of continuing, maintaining, and repeating all
projects after departure of U.S. personnel.
6 The primary objectives of the U.S. personnel must be
to teach and advise; rough and undesirable management
approaches aimed totally at completing a project on
time and within budget must be avoided.
7 Interpreters and translators for the U.S. forces must
be extremely knowledgeable about the native customs,
competent in the language (including the pertinent
technical vocabulary) , and interested in continually
advising and teaching other U.S. team members; U.S.
personnel must be knowledgeable about indigenous
customs and traditions and must show respect for these
at all times.
8 Established lines of communications between U.S.
teams, the host government, their military, and the
indigenous people must be respected and used.
9 U.S. military people must remain in the background
and let praise and publicity fall upon the local
people and their civil agencies, military forces, and
government
.
Table 2-1 [Ref. 12 :pp. 363-366
19
obvious capability. Effective relief was not tenable in
northern Iraq or Somalia until our armed forces restored
order.
A well developed transportation and logistics
capability enables the ability to transport and distribute
large volumes of emergency supplies to remote areas. Once
within the disaster area, the military can develop a
transportation and delivery system. In Kurdistan,
Bangladesh, and Somalia, the military used its trucks,
helicopters, airplanes, and ships to transport thousands
of tons of food, medicine and relief workers. A large
military field warehouse was established in northern Iraq.
Military logistics teams worked with NGOs 3 and local
medical personnel to catalog, store, prioritize, and
distribute materials. This is an example of the U.S.
military acting as the coordinator between a number of
players in conducting an efficient relief effort.
[Ref .6:p.387]
The "three Cs": command, control, and communication
were used in northern Iraq or Kurdistan. Our
organizational structure, superior communication
infrastructure, and international stature put the U.S. DOD
3 NGO: Non Governmental Organization. This term is used to refer to private
organizations such as CARE, Doctors Without Borders and Save The Children that provide a
number of services associated with humanitarian assistance or disaster relief efforts.
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in the position as the de facto coordinator of this large
scale IH/DRO. In Kurdistan we coordinated the efforts of 15
other coalition forces, 20 NGOs, and local Kurdish
groups. [Ref . 6:p. 387]
The military brings a self sufficiency to the field no
other organization can provide. The military deploys with
its own food, water, electricity, and shelter needed to
sustain operations. The military can rebuild
infrastructure and hospitals that will benefit the
population after they leave.
Acute medical care can be provided via our deployable
clinics, field hospitals, hospital ships, and medical
evacuation systems. These units can establish medical
services quickly in austere and remote environments.
Preventive medicine teams contribute to the efforts of
relief workers. They can conduct surveys that determine
the state of health of a given population, prevalent
diseases, vaccinations, and sanitary needs. These teams
bring with them public health labs that are often the
only ones in the area.
2 . Limitations
a. Training and Supplies Inadequate For IH/DRO
The primary limitation associated with the use of
U.S. military medical assets for IH/DRO is that the
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primary focus is to support combat operations, not IH/DRO.
This is why military medical care is designed primarily to
provide acute care to a population of predominantly young,
male, medically screened adults. This training may help
for trauma cases created by sudden disasters such as
earthquakes
.
However, the highest priorities in humanitarian
relief are to provide potable water, sanitation, good
nutrition, immunizations, health surveillance, education
systems, and primary care to a full spectrum of age groups
[Ref .6] .
Our deployable medical units have minimal
quantities of medications recommended by the World Health
Organization (WHO) for IH/DRO. This WHO medication list
consists of large quantities of rehydration salts,
pediatric supplies, and antibiotics.
Few DOD medical personnel receive adequate
training to treat problems common in women and children,
and few physicians receive training in humanitarian
assistance.
b. Inadequate Doctrine and Interservice
Coordination
There is minimal guidance in standing orders,
contingency plans, basic instructions, or field manuals
that address procedures for emergency relief. Medical
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relief missions are typically planned quickly and on an ad
hoc basis. These missions normally utilize a Joint Task
Force for command and control. They involve units from all
branches that are unfamiliar with each other with few
personnel experienced in IH/DRO.
Based on conversations with medical personnel who
have participated in IH/DROs, we do very well due to the'
superior personnel in our medical units. They simply
make it happen.
During my thesis travel to the 6th Medical Group
Hospital at MacDill AFB, I had the opportunity to talk to
Air Force Maj . Joann E. Lankford, the Nurse Exec, Medical
Services Flight, about training. It was her opinion that
if these missions are to continue, we need to change our
training of medical personnel from solely combat related to
medical training that encompasses the needs of IH/DRO. Most
military medical personnel I spoke with agreed with this
opinion.
c. Supply Problems
In Kurdistan during operation Provide Comfort, 90
percent of the deaths of children under 5 were diarrheal
disease, dehydration, and malnutrition. Supplies of
medications to help these conditions were initially
inadequate. Common military supplies may not be suitable
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for the local population.
An example is the "Meals Ready to Eat" (MREs)
.
MRE's have 6000 calories per meal and a high concentration
of salt. This is an inappropriate meal for dehydrated
children. Another potential problem is illustrated by
providing MREs with pork products to a Muslim population.
The DoD has addressed this problem with the
development of an MRE designed for humanitarian relief.
This "civilian MRE" is called the Humanitarian Daily Ration
(HDR)
.
It was developed utilizing Foreign Disaster
Relief Program funds which is one of the three components
of the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
Appropriation (OHDACA) . OHDACA is utilized for purely
humanitarian assistance type operations, referred to by the
CENTCOM HAST as HA Other.
The U.S. Naval Medical Logistics Command has
developed a humanitarian support block of medical supplies
for humanitarian assistance. This "code 05" block contains
medical supplies and can be used to overcome past initial
supply problems when supplies were intended for a young
male population instead of the full spectrum. The DoD is
making progress on the supply and logistics side of
conducting IH/DRO.
3. Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance, Tripler Army Medical
Center
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The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance was developed as a result of the
lessons learned from recent IH/DROs in the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Balkans. This congressionally
supported center opened in October of 1994. The mission is
very simple: to create a Center Of Excellence (COE) to
address the provision and facilitation of education,
training, and research in civil-military operations,
particularly those involving international disaster
management and humanitarian assistance. [Ref.13]
This COE has the potential to significantly enhance the
capability of the DoD in conducting IH/DRO.
Retired General Colin Powell envisioned a command
that would bring together a critical mass of experts in
disaster relief and conduct joint training in IH/DROs
[Ref .8:p.55] . The COE at Tripler Army Medical Center is not
as ambitious as Gen Powell's proposed command, but it is a
step in that direction. The expertise and services they
provide to the U.S. DoD and allies are identified in Table
2-2.
The Tripler COE is a partnership of resources of
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) , The Pacific Health
Services Support Area (HSSA) of Tripler Army Medical
Center, and the University of Hawaii. It provides academic
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and operational expertise with an international faculty
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that has experience in IH/DROs. The COE currently conducts
military training with the U.S. DOD, Japan Special Defense
Forces, and Singapore Armed Forces. Civil-Military
training has been conducted with Indonesia, Mongolia,
Thailand, and the former Yugoslavia. The COE has four
permanent staff members in office, thirty-one faculty
worldwide on stipend to assist in training, and one COE
representative at Tripler Hospital and PACOM. The COE is




A major component of the COE is the Pacific Disaster
Management Information Network (PDMIN). The PDMIN is an
Internet link to other disaster-related Internet sites,
disaster news, historical data, electronic journals,
discussion groups, e-mail, and full text publications which
include country specific disaster management plans and
handbooks. The current URL is http: //204 . 208 . 4 . 136.
D. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT BUDGETARY TRENDS
Budgeting for the costs of IH/DRO has been extremely
difficult in the past and will continue to be difficult in
the future. One can appreciate the difficult task of
budgeting for operations that result from worldwide
problems that develop after budget decisions are made.
Compounding this problem are material weaknesses in DOD
accounting systems that attempt to report incremental costs
associated with contingency operations, whether they are
peacekeeping or humanitarian in nature [Ref . 15 :p. 1]
.
It is also difficult to determine an exact amount of
the DoD' s total expenditure on IH/DRO. As stated earlier,
contingency operations defined as peacekeeping can include
significant expenditures that could be defined as purely
humanitarian in nature. An example would be the $784
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million spent by the DoD from fiscal year 1992 through 1995
for humanitarian airdrops over Bosnia, operation of the
Zagreb Croatia hospital, and airlift of food, clothing, and
medical supplies to Sarajevo [Ref.l6:p. 25].
DoD' s characterization of individual operations as
combat, peace, or humanitarian is in a state of flux. For
example, the Secretary's 1994 report characterized the
DoD' s operation in Northern Iraq as U.S. forces acting in
support of U.N. peace operations, while the Secretaries'
1995 report characterizes this operation as humanitarian
and refugee assistance [Ref . 17 :p. 35] . Through fiscal year
1996, DoD has not budgeted for the cost of contingencies.
When tasked to perform contingency operations, the DoD
shifts funds within existing appropriations. Subsequently,
the DoD seeks supplemental funding or reprogramming of
appropriated funds to cover its costs. For FY 96, the
administration requested $620 million in supplemental
funding and reprogramming of $991 million [Ref . 15 :p. 9]
.
This method of dealing with costs of contingencies
which include IH/DRO can create budget problems that cut
resources to other areas in the DoD. For example, in
fiscal year 1993 the DoD sought and received a supplemental
appropriation for operations in Somalia. However, $750
million was rescinded from other areas in the DoD budget,
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which means Congress provided no new funds.
A July 1995 Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System
(JULLS) document, entitled "Funding of Humanitarian/
Peacemaking/Peacekeeping Operations," noted several
problems in funding IH/DRO. It stated there are a couple of
sources of funding for Humanitarian Operations. However,
there is no clear definition of Humanitarian Operations to
determine when and where these funds apply.
The JULLS Report recommended that the Secretary of
Defense, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, take action
to establish a readily available source of funding for
IH/DRO. In response to this JULLS, OSD (SOLIC) agreed that
new funding mechanisms need to be established for
resourcing operations such as Operation Restore Hope. The
OSD (Comptroller) stated that Congress has expressed a
reluctance in the past to approve funding in advance of
specific identified operations. Code J-8 of the Joint
Staff has developed a Handbook that describes various
sources and authorities for funding military OOTW, such as
humanitarian assistance, refugee relocation, and disaster
relief. This handbook has been distributed to OSD and the
CINC comptrollers. On 8 Feb 1995, the OSD comptroller
published changes to DoD 7000. 14-R, Financial Management
Regulation, Volume 12, Chapter 23. It includes
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guidance for determining costs of contingencies and
procedures for obtaining reimbursements form other
agencies. [Ref.18]
1. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid
Appropriation (OHDACA)
As mentioned earlier there are specific funds that
can be utilized for IH/DRO. The one used first and
foremost is OHDACA. This appropriations consolidates
funding for three existing programs. These programs
are the Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) , which
includes transportation, the Humanitarian Demining Program,
and the Foreign Disaster Relief Program.
These programs support the regional Unified-Commander-
in Chief's (CINC's) peacetime engagement mission. OHDACA
activities are prioritized in conjunction with the Dept . of
State, and approved by the Secretary of Defense. This is
done to insure unity of effort in compliance with foreign
policy objectives.
The HAP was established in 1986 and is designed to
avert humanitarian crises, promote democratic development,
and enable countries to recover from conflict. Objectives
are accomplished by transportation of non-lethal DOD
property and donated materials from private agencies and
NGOs.
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The Humanitarian Demining Program assists countries in
clearing land mines that are the residue of civil wars. The
Department of State estimates that over 100 million mines
are scattered across the globe and that 1200 people per
month are killed or maimed by mines [Ref. 19].
The Foreign Disaster Relief Program supports DOD
response to natural and man-made foreign disaster. This
program allows the CINCs to respond to disasters within
their Area Of Responsibility (AOR) without dipping into
their own O&M accounts. These funds have helped CINCs
defray costs in natural disasters in Kobe, Japan, Columbia,
and India. OHDACA paid for transportation in manmade
disasters as well as in Rwanda and Bosnia.
The FY 1997 President's Budget request totals $80.5
million for OHDACA programs. A total of $30 million is
earmarked for HAP, $25 million for the Humanitarian
Demining Program, and $25.5 million for the Foreign
Disaster Relief Program. Of note, $19 million of the $25.5
million is earmarked to purchase the new Humanitarian Daily
Ration (HDR) , a humanitarian MRE [Ref. 19]. Funds are
available for obligation for two years, to preclude end-
year interruptions in ongoing programs, such as demining
and disaster contingency responses.
The overall trend for the OHDACA from 1995 to 1997 is
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decreasing in amount. The actual FY 95 amount was $83.4
million, FY 96 $49 million and $54.5 million was authorized
for FY 97 [Ref.20]. For FY 97, $20 million is earmarked
for demining and the remainder will be used for HAP and
Disaster Relief. Unless there is a significant decrease in
ission obligations, this declining trend in OHDACA money
ill place the burden for payin for these operations on
the Unified Command comptrollers.
2. CINC Initiative Fund
The CINC Initiative Fund is placed under the control
of the Chairman, JCS, for use by the CINCs. For FY 95, $25
million was appropriated. This fund is to be utilized for
unforseen contingency requirements for which normal service
funding is not readily available. Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance is one of the authorized activities for this
fund. Annual Humanitarian Civic Assistance missions (HCA)
cannot utilize this fund because it is already budgeted for
in the CINCs' annual O&M budget.
These two funds are two potential sources for funding
IH/DRO. More specific guidelines need to be promulgated to
first define exactly what constitutes a humanitarian
mission, and second, exactly what funding mechanism should
be used.
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III. IH/DRO LAWS, DOCTRINE, INSTRUCTIONS, AND
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
This chapter reviews the current legal authority,
doctrine, DoD instructions, and how U.S. government agencies
coordinate to provide medical assets abroad for IH/DRO.
Numerous sections of Title 10 USC that pertain to IH/DRO
will be reviewed to gain an understanding of the legal
ramifications and limits on the DoD to conduct IH/DRO. The
limited amount of doctrine developed thus far on how to
conduct IH/DRO will be reviewed. Pertinent DoD instructions
will be reviewed to give an understanding of the delegation
of responsibility within the DoD for conducting IH/DRO. The
last section will present a summation of the tangled web of
interagency relationships and coordination utilized to
conduct IH/DRO.
A. LAWS WHICH AUTHORIZE IH/DRO
1. Title 10 USC Sec. 401: Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military
Operations
Section 401 of Title 10, U.S. Code, in effect,
authorizes the Humanitarian Civic Assistance program to be
administered by the Unified Commands of USCENTCOM, USECOM,
USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. This program allows the Secretary
of Defense to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance
activities in conjunction with an authorized military
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operation with the armed forces of an authorized country.
The criteria that must be met to conduct an HCA operation
are set forth in Table 3-1.
1 The operation will promote the security interest of
the U.S. and the authorized country.
The operation should enhance the operational
readiness skills of members of the armed forces who
participate in the activities.
HCA activities carried out under section 401 shall
complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of
assistance provided to the country concerned by any
agency or department of the United States.
HCA may not be provided under section 401 to any
individual or group engaged in military or
paramilitary activity.
HCA may not be provided under section 401 to any
foreign country unless the Secretary of State
approves of such assistance.
Expenses incurred during HCA activities shall be
paid for out of funds specifically appropriated for
such purpose.
The DoD may use its own O&M funds for minimal
expenditures to cover incidental costs of carrying
out such assistance.
Table 3-1 [Ref. 21]
Section 401 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit
to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report, not later
than March 1 of each year, on activities carried out during
the preceding fiscal year. Section 401 defines "humanitarian
and civic assistance" to include medical, dental, and
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veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country. It
also includes construction of rudimentary roads, wells,
sanitation facilities, and construction of public
facilities. [Ref. 21]
2. Title 10 USC Sec. 402: Transportation of
Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries
Section 402 of Title 10 authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to transport, without charge, supplies which have
been furnished by an NGO that is intended for humanitarian
assistance. These supplies may be transported only on a
space available basis. The restrictions for transport are
provided in Table 3-2.
1 Transportation of such supplies is consistent with the
foreign policy of the United States.
2 The supplies to be transported are suitable for
humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.
3 There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such
supplies by the people for whom they are intended.
4 The supplies will in fact be used for humanitarian
purposes
.
5 Adequate arrangements have been made for the
distribution of such supplies in the destination
country.
Table 3-2 [Ref. 21]
It is the responsibility of the donor to ensure that
the supplies to be transported are suitable for transport.
The supplies transported may be distributed by the U.S.
Government, a foreign government, an international
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organization, or a private nonprofit relief organization.
Supplies under section 402 may not be transported to a
military or paramilitary organization.
The Secretary of State shall submit a report, not later
than July 31 each year, to the Senate Armed Services and
Foreign Relations Committees and the House of
Representatives Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs. This report identifies the origin, contents,
destination, and disposition of all supplies transported
under Title 10 Section 402 during the 12-month period ending
on the preceding June 30. [Ref. 21]
3. Title 10 USC Sec. 404: Foreign Disaster Assistance
Section 404 of Title 10 provides authorization for the
DoD to conduct Humanitarian Assistance in disasters abroad,
natural or manmade, to prevent the loss of lives. The
President must submit a report to Congress no later than 48
hours after commencing the operation. At a minimum, this
report must contain the items in Table 3-3 to justify and
explain the action.
Executive Order 12966-Foreign Disaster Assistance, was
signed into law by President Bill Clinton on July 14, 1995.
This order governs the implementation of section 404 of
title 10, USC. It directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide assistance for natural or manmade disasters when
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the Secretary of Defense determines that such assistance is
necessary to prevent loss of lives. The Secretary of
Defense is permitted to provide disaster assistance only at
the direction of the President or with concurrence from the
Secretary of State. In an emergency situation to save human
lives, the Secretary of Defense can execute disaster relief
and notify the Secretary of State as soon as practicable
thereafter. This order speeds up the medical response to
disasters and therefore saves lives in the critical early
hours of a disaster.
In providing assistance covered by this executive
order, the Secretary of Defense is required to consult with
the Administrator of the Agency for International
Development, in the Administrator's capacity as the




1 The manmade or natural disaster for which disaster
assistance is necessary.
The threat to human lives presented by the disaster
The U.S. military personnel and material resources
that are involved or expected to be involved.
The disaster assistance that is being provided or is
expected to be provided by other nations, public and
private relief organizations.
The anticipated duration of the disaster assistance
activities
.
Table 3-3 [Ref. 21]
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4. Title 10 USC Sec. 2547: Excess Nonlethal Supplies:
Humanitarian Relief
Section 2547 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
make available for humanitarian relief nonlethal excess
supplies. These excess supplies made available for
humanitarian relief shall be transferred to the Secretary of
State for distribution. The Secretary of State must submit
an annual report on the disposition of all excess supplies
transferred by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of
State during the preceding year. This report is submitted
to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives. [Ref. 21]
5. Title 10 USC Sec. 2551: Humanitarian Assistance
Section 2551 defines authorized assistance. It states
that to the extent provided in defense Authorization Acts,
funds to be appropriated to the DoD for a fiscal year for
humanitarian assistance will be used for the purpose of
providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for
other humanitarian purposes worldwide. This section allows
the Secretary of Defense to transfer appropriated funds to
the Secretary of State for the payment of costs incurred.
These costs include administrative costs incurred providing
transportation, purchase of transportation assets for the
distribution of humanitarian supplies in the relief area,
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and transportation costs.
Funds appropriated for humanitarian assistance for the
purposes of Section 2551 remain available until expended.
[Ref. 21]
B. DOD DOCTRINE FOR IH/DRO
Doctrine governing IH/DRO missions is sorely lacking.
This deficiency is widely acknowledged and organizations
within the DoD are currently working on developing doctrine
for IH/DRO to remedy this deficiency.
An example of one such organization working on mission
specific IH/DRO doctrine is the Health Services Support
Division of the Naval Doctrine Command. The Naval Doctrine
Command is located in Norfolk, VA and the HSS Division is
located in Quantico, VA [Ref. 25] . The director of the
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance, Dr. Skip Burkle, has acknowledged a need for
detailed doctrine and this is an area his organization is
exploring as well.
The doctrine that is available is very general in
nature. Two JCS Pubs pertaining to IH/DRO are JCS Pub
3-07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, and JCS Pub 4-02, Doctrine
for Health Services Support.
1. JCS Pub 3-07: Military Operations Other Than War
This pub makes a very sharp distinction between
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Humanitarian Assistance and the Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance (HCA) program [Ref. 11].
a. Humanitarian Assistance
The purpose and types of HA operations as
specified in JCS Pub 3-07 are illustrated in Table 3-4
PURPOSE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
To relieve or reduce the results of natural or
manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.
Limited in scope and duration.
Supplements or complements efforts of host nation.
May cover a broad range of missions.
TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
Coordinated by the United Nations*
U.S. acts in concert with other multilateral forces
U.S. responds imiiater&i-l^v
Table 3-4 [Ref. 11]
According to JCS Pub 3-07, HA operations may be
directed by the NCA when a situation threatens the political
or military stability of a region considered of interest to
the United States, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian
situation itself sufficient to warrant action. The
Department of State or the U.S. Ambassador in country is
responsible for declaring a foreign disaster that requires
HA.
Within the DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense for
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Policy has the overall responsibility for developing
military policy for IH/DRO. [Ref. 11]
b. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
In JCS Pub 3-07, HCA falls under what is called
Nation Assistance Programs. These programs are defined as
civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by U.S.
forces within that nation's territory during peacetime,
crisis, or war, based on agreements between the U.S. and the
host country. The goal is to promote long term regional
stability. Supporting this goal, HCA operations are
integrated through the U.S. Ambassador's Country Plan.
Examples of HCA activities include medical, dental, and
veterinary care in rural areas. It also may involve
construction of surface roads, well drilling, and repair of
public facilities. [Ref. 11]
2. JCS Pub 4-02: Doctrine for Health Services Support
in Joint Operations
JCS Pub 4-02 reiterates JCS Pub 3-07 guidelines for
HCA and Humanitarian Assistance in Pub 4-02 chapter IV. In
addition to these basic guidelines from Pub 4-02, Pub 3-07
reviews the special requirements and considerations for
Health Service Support (HSS) in conducting OOTW in a joint
environment
.
a. HSS in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)
These medical civic actions usually occur as a
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component of a larger operation. The Unified Command must
coordinate with all concerned agencies and ensure
integration into the respective U.S. Embassy plan. These
concerned agencies are ASD (SOLIC), the host nation
government and health service officials, the U.S. Ambassador
and Country Team, USAID, and the on-scene commander.
In regard to HCA operations, JCS Pub 4-02 states
that the geographic combatant commander should ensure that
the mission statement of the HSS organization clearly
supports the HCA operation prior to commencing that
operation [Ref. 26]. Coordination with the Joint Force
Surgeon is essential to ensure that the HSS organization
is capable of and legally allowed to fulfill the
requirements of the mission statement. These requirements
are to ensure that valuable time and resources are not
wasted. Assessment factors in planning for medical HCA
operations are listed in Table 3-5.
b. HSS in Humanitarian Assistance
JCS Pub 4-02 refers to purely humanitarian
assistance as Other HA to distinguish them from HCA
operations. Pub 4-02 focuses on HA in disaster assistance.
It states that HSS assistance for disaster requires a rapid
assessment of damage to tailor the required HSS element
[Ref. 26]. An assessment team should have a wide range of
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specialties to conduct an accurate assessment. Although the
name of the assessment team is not specifically stated in
Pub 4-02, the U.S. currently uses a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) headed by the Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID. [Ref. 7]
Preventive medicine will play a key role in the
relief effort. Disasters can disrupt sanitation control
ASSES^ENT FACTORS IN JUDICAL HCA PLANNING
Population demographics.
General health, of population.
Sanitation and personal hygiene.
Endemic ^diseases.





-.^> .. . .. .- ....... . - ... ..— . . ... ... ...... .... - ... .
....In^aj^t. saoxtaiit^-Xal;^^, .„.,,, .. . .....,, .. . .
Availability and accessibility of health care
delivery systems and processes.
- Se^oiidarY-.~-afKi^ - •
- supportifig--fci?a^si)©^t"ateioiS'"'e^^M:Mrt'iesv- :
Education and training levels of health service
support professionals and technicians.
Ijocai facilities for production of ' medical etpipment
and supplies.
Political impact of providing care to the host
nation population.
I^i^^t^m;requiremeixjts/^^^ the ability,, to provide
,.
contiimitv_.o£,.care,«.,. „ . .... ._.... ... ,....,,..... .,,-.......-,..- .,..- ....... ^.... -
Table 3-5 [Ref. 26]
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which can cause disease outbreaks. Therefore, a critical
component of HSS is including the preventive medicine
personnel in the planning.
C. DoD INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES PERTAINING TO IH/DRO
1. DoDD 2205.2: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
(HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military
Operations, October 6, 1994, ASD (SO/LIC)
This instruction establishes DoD policy and assigns
responsibilities for conducting HCA activities. HCA
operations must adhere to the criteria outlined in Table 3-
1. These criteria are drived from Title 10 USC Sec. 401 and
reiterated in DODD 2205.2 with a few additional detailed
constraints. One of these details is that HCA activities
are to be conducted with the approval of the host nation and
local civilian authorities. U.S. commanders may engage in
certain activities essential to the accomplishment of their
military operation that result in incidental benefits to the
local population, but are not considered to be activities
under Title 10 USC Sec. 401. An example would be for a
commander to build a road to get to a base camp. Expenses
incurred as a result of HCA operations must be paid for out
of funds specifically appropriated for HCA.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflicts (ASD (SO/LIC) ) acts as
the program manager for the HCA program. ASD (SO/LIC) acts as
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point of contact for HCA with other executive branch
agencies
.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs,
a component of USD (Personnel & Readiness) , reviews and
recommends to USD(P) changes to HCA that involve medical
personnel and would enhance medical operational readiness
skills. It should be noted that ASD (SO/LIC) is a component
of USD (Policy) . To gain a better understanding of the
organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
its components involved in IH/DRO, Table 3-6 is provided.
The Chairman of the JCS has the responsibility to
review, coordinate, and forward recommendations to USD
(Policy) for approval of annual HCA execution plans proposed
by the Unified Commands.
Commanders of Unified Combatant Commands are
responsible for developing an annual execution plan for HCA
activities within their Area Of Responsibility (AOR) . To
identify the Unified Commands and priority countries in
their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) , Table 3-7 is provided.
The Unified Commands execute HCA activities in conjunction
with military operations in their AORs . The Unified
Commands are tasked to coordinate all details of HCA
operations. An example would be to identify possible HCA
projects and coordinate them with the indigenous
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Secretary of Defense

















































































































Table 3-6 [Ref. 23]
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UNIFIED COMMAND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)
Priority Countries Identified by OSD (Global Affairs)
CENTCOM USECOM PACOM SOUTHCOM
Afghanistan Albania Cambodia Guyana
Bahrain Estonia Laos Belize
Djibouti Hungary Thailand Panama
Egypt Romania Philippines Peru
Eritrea Bulgaria Bangladesh Ecuador
Ethiopia Macedonia Indonesia El Salvador
Jordan Lithuania Solomanls Guatemala
Iran Lebanon -•<-•- -Tonga— -•— Nicaragua
Iraq Turkey Fiji Honduras
Kenya Poland Vanuatu Suriname
Kuwait Latvia •$%&mM.& Costa Rica
Oman Botswana Maldives Bolivia
Pakistan Uganda Mongolia Paraguay
Qatar Rwanda Nepal Brazil
Saudi Arabia Angola Madagascar Chile
Seychelles Ivory Coast Western Samoa Argentina













Table 3-7 [ Ref. 24 ]
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country's government and military. This is done with the
ambassador and the country team which includes DoD
personnel
.
2. DoDI 2205.3: Implementing Procedures for the HCA
Program, Jan 27, 1995, ASD (SO/LIC)
This instruction implements policy, defines
responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the HCA
Program under DoDD 2205.2. It basically reiterates DoDD
2205.2 with more detailed coordinating responsibilities.
DoDI 2205.3 states that before USD (Policy) issues
final approval of the Unified Combatant Command Commander's
proposed annual HCA activity plans, USD (Policy) shall
ensure that plans are coordinated with, and have the
concurrence of, the Secretaries of the Military Departments,
the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International
Security Affairs, International Security Policy, Reserve
Affairs, and Health Affairs, the General Counsel of the DoD,
and the Comptroller of the DoD. USD (Policy) shall also
obtain approval of the Department of State and the Agency
for International Development (USAID)
.
HCA activities are paid for out of O&M funds budgeted
by each military department. Each Unified Command falls
under the budget authority of one of the Services. An
example is that CENTCOM HCA is funded by Air Force O&M.
[Ref. 20]
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3. DoDD 5100.46: Foreign Disaster Relief, December 4,
1975, ASD (ISA)
This directive states DoD policy for the employment of
its resources in foreign disaster relief operations. It
also assigns responsibilities for carrying out this policy.
Foreign disaster relief is defined as prompt aid which
can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster
victims. This includes humanitarian services,
transportation, provision of food, clothing, medicines,
bedding, and temporary shelter. This directive also
provides for the furnishing of medical materiel, and medical
and technical personnel. Disaster is defined as an act of
nature such as an earthquake, or an act of man such as civil
strife, epidemic or rioting.
The coordination of DoD disaster response starts with
the Department of State determining that response is
required. The Department of State contacts the ASD
(International Security Affairs) . ASD (ISA) gets the ball
rolling by contacting the JCS. The JCS, depending on the
magnitude of the disaster, will establish a Joint Task Force
to handle the relief efforts.
4. DoDD 5111.10: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict
(ASD(SO/LIC)) , March 22, 1995.
This directive establishes the responsibilities,
functions, relationships, and authorities of ASD (SO/LIC)
.
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In regards to IH/DRO, DoD Instructions 2205.2 established
ASD(SO/LIC) as program manager of the HCA program. ASD
(SO/LIC) was also responsible, as per this instruction, for
humanitarian and disaster relief. In June of 1996, a new
office was established called Peacekeeping and Humanitarian
Assistance. This new office is within ASD (Strategy and
Requirements) which is a component of USD (Policy) [Ref.
20] . This new office has assumed responsibility for HA
operations, while ASD(SOLIC) maintains responsibility for
HCA.
The control and coordination of IH/DRO within the DoD
is in a dynamic state and continually evolving. The Office
of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance does not have an
Instruction regarding HA promulgated at this time. Mr.
Claudio Lillenfeld, advisor for Policy Programs,
ASD (Strategy And Requirements), indicates that they are
currently writing an instruction [Ref. 20].
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance is responsible
for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the
implementation of policy for DoD humanitarian assistance,
foreign disaster relief, and DoD responses to migration
emergencies such as the Cuban refugee crisis. This new
office is also responsible for programming, planning,
justifying, and executing the (OHDACA) appropriation, citing
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Title 10 USC Sec. 2551. [Ref. 20]
D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF IH/DRO
Conducting IH/DRO is a very complex operation not only
in physically implementing an operation but overcoming the
tremendous complexity of coordinating activities within the
DoD, Department of State, U. S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) , the host government, United Nations,
NGOs, and other players, depending on the operation. I will
document the command relationships as outlined in a Center
for Naval Analyses (CNA) study. The complex coordination
for HCA and HA disaster relief operations will be outlined
with text and figures.
1 . Command Relationships in Conducting IH/DRO
One of the biggest problems in conducting and
coordinating IH/DRO is establishing command relationships.
There are three factors identified by the Center for Naval
Analyses that make the traditional military chain of command
to conduct IH/DRO insufficient [Ref. 27] . The first of
these factors consists of a need for a closely coordinated
U.S. government interagency response. The military does not
have sole responsibility or authority to conduct IH/DRO and
must interact with agencies outside the DoD.
A second factor is that these operations support the
work of other groups involved, such as NGOs, international
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organizations, and host governments.
Finally, involvement with the United Nations or a
coalition of other governments adds another layer of
complexity. [Ref. 27]
The command relationships within the U.S. government
for conducting these operation were identified by the Center












Figure 3-1 [Ref. 27]
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At the strategic level coordination, not command, is
essential. The USAID Administrator serves as the
President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster
Assistance. Therefore, the burden of coordination falls on
the Administrator of USAID. The lead agency is not defined
at the other levels. Consequently, the CINC is the de facto
leader at the operational level. The CINC must communicate
regularly both up and down the chain of command to ensure
that policy promulgated at the top becomes an operational
reality with the CJTF.
The Mission Statement outlines the purpose and scope of
a future mission. The responsibility for planning IH/DRO
passes from the NCA to the JCS to a CINC and finally
the JTF. A CNA report stated that each group writes its own
slightly different Mission Statement [Ref. 28]. The
resulting mission can end up being different from what was
originally intended from the top. This would create
problems in coordination.
This is especially true for IH/DRO because there is a
lack of established doctrine and success is not as clearly
defined as in war-fighting [Ref. 28] . The report
recommended that all levels should examine Mission Statement
wording for ambiguous language. It stated that the military
should standardize language and develop Measures Of
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Effectiveness (MOE) for IH/DRO.
2. Coordination of Foreign Disaster Relief
And Humanitarian Assistance
The CINCs carry out IH/DRO in support of State
Department objectives. The CINC, therefore, transforms
national-level policy into action. There are three
phases associated with conducting disaster management
operations [Ref
. 29: p. 443] . Phase I is Deployment and
Assessment, Phase II is Responses, and Phase III is
Transition and Redeployment.
a. Phase I: Deployment and Assessment
The process is started with the host nation
requesting assistance through the U.S. Ambassador. The
Ambassador, with the assistance of the embassy' s country
team, develops a recommendation to submit to the State
Department. If the State Department declares a disaster, it
will determine the policy for the relief effort.
This State Department effort is developed by the USAID and
its coordinating Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA)
.
OFDA will coordinate the U.S. government
disaster relief responses, procure supplies, transportation,
and coordinate assistance with NGOs and other international
organizations such as the Red Cross. OFDA can deploy the
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) into the area to
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assess needs. OFDA usually requests DoD equipment and
transportation in the early stages of a disaster. [Ref. 29]
b. Phase II: Responses
After the DoD receives the request to provide
assistance from OFDA the CJCS oversees the military
logistics response to the crisis. After receiving policy
from the strategic command level, the regional CINC
organizes, plans, and initiates the action. This is the
point where the CINC develops the Mission Statement that
outlines the purpose and objectives of the mission. The
Joint Task Force (JTF) carries out the objectives of the
mission statement. The CINC uses the Humanitarian
Assistance Survey Team (HAST) , to assess the mortality,
injury, illness, infrastructure and overall status of the
disaster area. The Unified Command medical operations staff
provides medical teams with current host country health
information. The response time is critical in disasters to
reduce the loss of life. The Strategic Disaster plan
gives the CINC 2 hours to determine military support
availability after DoD notification. The HAST must be
deployed in 12 hours and relief must be in the disaster area
within 48 to 72 hours.
C. Phase III: Transition and Redeployment
This phase starts after immediate life saving
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efforts have been accomplished and rehabilitation begins.
Phase III ends when the objectives outlined in the Mission
Statement have been achieved. The JTF then disbands and
returns home. Assistance continues under the direction
of the U.S. Ambassador and OFDA representatives.
A review of coordination for disaster relief is
provided in Figure 3-2.
3 . Coordination and Approval of HCA
The coordination and levels of approval for the HCA
program were provided earlier in Chapter Three with a review
of DoD Directive 2205.2 and DoD Instruction 2205.3. A
summary of the approval levels and interagency coordination
are provided in Figure 3-3. Figure 3-3 was provided by the
USCENTCOM Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) . This
diagram is typical of the coordination and interagency
involvement with HCA in the five Unified Commands that
conduct HCA operations. The five commands are USCENTCOM,
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Figure 3-3 [Ref. 30]
IV. PLANNING AND EXECUTING IH/DRO
Chapter IV will review the two distinct types of
Humanitarian missions.
Operation Sea Signal was a pure Humanitarian Assistance
operation referred to by CENTCOM HAST as HA (other)
.
Operation Sea Signal was a large scale operation involving a
large contingent of DoD medical assets that are typical of
these operations. Humanitarian Assistance operations are
emergent in nature and therefore not as definitively
preplanned and budgeted for as HCA operations.
Operation Eager Tiger was typical of a small scale
Humanitarian Civic Assistance operation that was short in
duration and is part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Nation Assistance Program.
While no two of these distinct types of operations are
exactly the same, the intent of this chapter is to give
insight into types of planning and execution problems faced
while conducting IH/DRO. Two officers involved in these
operations were interviewed to give their personal point of
view on the conduct and outcome of the operation in which
they were involved.
Major D. Randall Ziss, USAF, is the Director of
Pharmacy of the 6th Medical Group, located at MacDill AFB,
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Tampa, FL. He deployed with the 6th Air Transportable
Hospital (ATH) in support of Operation Sea Signal. He was
interviewed and provided valuable insight into Operation Sea
Signal [Ref. 33]. LtCol. James Rodgers, USAF, MC, FS, is
Commander, Medical Services Flight of the 6th Medical Group.
Col. Rodgers was interviewed concerning his participation in
operation Eager Tiger, conducted in Jordan from April to May
1996 [Ref. 34]. He provided candid opinions and suggestions
for future HCA operations involving DoD medical assets.
A. OPERATION SEA SIGNAL (HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE)
This review will focus on the participation of the U.S.
Air Force 6th Air Transportable Hospital (ATH) in Operation
Sea Signal from 8 September to 8 December 1994 [Ref. 31]
.
1. Synopsis of Mission
Operation Sea Signal was an operation designated to
provide Humanitarian Assistance to the thousands of
Haitian and Cuban migrants desperately trying to gain access
to the United States. These migrants were detained and cared
for in temporary camps located on the U.S. Navy base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The regional CINC, USACOM, established
Joint Task Force 160 to respond to the crisis.
The purpose of the 6th ATH involvement in Operation Sea
Signal was to provide Echelon I and II medical care and
emergency dental care to Haitian and Cuban migrants. They
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also provided care to non-migrant personnel, primarily Joint
Task Force (JTF) 160 personnel. The mission of the
medical component was detailed in Annex Q to JTF-160 OPLAN
1-94, Medical Service. OPLANS are developed and utilized to
delineate JTF component responsibilities and objectives.
Echelons of care above those available in Guantanamo Bay
were considered for Medevac to facilities in the United
States in accordance with Annex Q.
Other medical players in Operation Sea Signal were
Guantanamo Bay Naval Hospital, 59th USAF ATH, and the U.S.
Army 147th MEDLOG Company to provide logistical support
[Ref . 32]
.
2. 6TH ATH Capabilities
The 6TH ATH was capable of providing the full spectrum
of general surgical procedures not requiring specialized
radiological equipment. Elective surgical procedures were
avoided unless there was a threat to life, limb, or
eyesight. The 6th ATH is a 50 bed medical/surgical facility.
The ATH was modified to accommodate 57 inpatients and
provide outpatient care to as many as 20,000. If needed,
the 6th ATH could expand to 100 inpatient beds.
3 . Chain of Command
Operationally, the 6th ATH reported directly to the JTF
Surgeon. For administrative matters such as billeting,
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personnel actions, and rotations, the chain of
command started with the Air Force Forces (deployed)
Commander. This is typical of chain of command in Joint
Task Force elements for IH/DRO [Ref. 33]. The 6th ATH
Bioenvironmental Engineering and Military Public Health
personnel were integrated into the JTF Preventive Medicine
Team. Again these personnel reported operationally to the
JTF Team Chief and administratively back to the 6th ATH.
4 . Operations
In preparation for deployment to Guantanamo Bay, the
6th ATH made changes to their normal load out of medicines
and equipment due to the nature of the mission. Obviously
the battlefield mission scenario was de-emphasized and
additional medications needed for Humanitarian Assistance
were added to their Table of Allowances or Formulary. 4
Medical conditions found in third world areas and tropical
diseases were emphasized in planning for expected cases.
Medical care was provided by sending in teams to
the migrant camps. Patients were initially screened in the
camps and then transported to the ATH if required.
Initially, the majority of care was directed to patients
with malaria, diseases, and injuries caused by exposure
4 The formulary is a list of authorized medications that are carried by a hospital pharmacy.
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while at sea. When camps were fully established, a
systematic approach to medical care was initiated. All
Haitian migrants were immunized for a variety of diseases.
A high incidence of Pulmonary Tuberculosis, HIV and dental
problems was found.
5 . Manpower
A normal staff of 147 personnel was augmented by
42 personnel from Wilford Hall Medical Center and 3rd
Medical Group from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. These additional
personnel were there to meet the demand of contingency
operations and additional obstetrical and pediatric
taskings. Naval Dental officers and technicians were added
to provide dental care.
The unit consistently included 165 to 200 members.
Assigned personnel deployed from active Air Force, Air Force
Guard and Reserve units from several states and bases. The
average was 67 percent active Air Force, 3 percent Active
Navy, and 30 percent Guard and Reserve assigned during the
three month period. The staff usually consisted of six
family practitioners, two obstetricians, two pediatricians,
five internal medicine and infectious disease specialists,
one general surgeon, two radiologists, two nurse
anesthetists, two pediatric nurse practitioners, four




During the period of 8 September to 8 December 1994,
the 6th ATH averaged per month, 24,007 outpatient visits,
164 admissions, 567 inpatient days, 16 operations, 28
newborns, 50 well baby checks, 1,568 X-rays, 6,417
laboratory procedures, and 6,192 prescriptions. The unit
accomplished 49,771 immunizations in August alone.
A rough estimate of operation costs was developed by Major










OPERATION SEA SIGNAL COSTS
$250, 000/day for food consisting mainly of rice and
beans
.
$60,000/week and $1.5 Million total for medication.
$1 Million for vaccinations.
$35, 000/day for ship billeting. Ships were chartered
to alleviate the U.S. personnel billeting shortage.
$2 Million/day total cost (est.).
Table 4-1 [Ref. 32]
7 . Observations
Medical resupply was provided initially by the home
unit, the 6th Medical Group, MacDill AFB, via a weekly C-12
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) flight, which was
coordinated by medical logistics personnel. Medical
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personnel associated with the operation indicated that the
resupply pipeline was not sufficient to keep up with the
needs of the ATH [Ref . 33] . The priority system was abused
and a backlog of transport quickly developed. When a
critical item was needed, a 6th ATH member would call the
flight line and literally have certain items segregated for
urgent transport. No differentiation was made between
medical supplies and repair parts. Hence important drugs
would get the same expediency as wood for housing.
No formal logistics effort was established prior to
commencing the operation. In mid September 1994, the 6th
ATH was directed to use the 147th US Army MEDLOG company as
its "depot" for all medical supplies. However, the 147th
was not properly stocked to meet their requirements [Ref.
31]. The 147th had not established adequate resupply lines
and was not properly stocked until late October 1994. It is
critical that MEDLOG companies need to be in the area of
operation, properly stocked, and have a dependable resupply
line established before medical operations begin.
Another problem was that the 6th ATH not only treated
the Cuban and Haitian migrants but also the U.N.,Red Cross,
and other agencies that did not bring their own medical care
capacity. The 6th ATH even treated the ACLU members who
were there to, "protect the rights of the
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migrants." The Task Force also had to feed and provide
scarce shelter to these other groups. Some of the best
accommodations were provided to these agencies' senior
officials, to the dismay of the military members providing
relief. Joint Task Force planners need to take these
additional agencies into account in future operations.
It was discovered that the stress level for DoD medical
personnel providing relief peaked at three months.
The after action report stated that personnel rotations
rarely occurred on time. This was not good for morale.
A policy was established to rotate high stress billets
such as linguists, chaplains, and medics. These were people
who had close, day to day contact with the migrants. The
migrants were irritable and dealing with them was, at times,
not a pleasurable experience [Ref. 33]. This policy should
be followed in similar future operations.
B. OPERATION EAGER TIGER (HCA)
Operation Eager Tiger was executed by DoD medical
personnel as an asset of USCENTCOM. The majority of these
personnel were attached to the 6th Medical Group, Air Combat
Command, MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL. They were to provide
Humanitarian Medical- Assistance in partnership with a
Jordanian medical team. The operation occurred between 29
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April and 14 May 1996, with 12 days in Jordan.
1. Synopsis of Mission
The objective of the medical HCA operation was to
provide assistance to the Jordanian medical team providing
health screenings and medical care to school children and
civilians in northern and southern Jordan. The team was to
perform complete physicals and associated lab work. A large
amount of equipment was transported from MacDill AFB with
the team. Table 4-2 details the items utilized.
This list served the team well and could be used by medical







Microscope (later determined not needed!
5 Line items of medical supplies and medications
Preventative medicine educational materials
Portable generators and transformers with extension cables
Table 4-2 [Ref. 35]
During the twelve days in Jordan the team worked five
days, traveled seven days, and had four non work days.
The team screened five schools, three in southern Jordan,
and two in the north.
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2. Medical Team Capabilities
The team had the capability to perform procedures
inherent in physical screening. There were no surgical
capabilities, as that was not within the scope of this HCA
mission. They used the equipment in Table 4-2 to give
comprehensive exams to the school children. Any major
medical problems discovered upon examination were relayed to
the Jordanian team members for treatment at a local
hospital
.
3. Operations and Productivity
The joint medical team visited three schools in
southern Jordan near Al-Quara and two schools in northern
Jordan near Al-Mafraq. During the five work days, the team
screened 2,383 students and teachers and performed 6,790
procedures [Ref. 35].
A medical record, vital statistics, blood pressure,
physical exam, and eye exam were performed on all students.
Further testing was required on identified eye and abdominal
problems by automated refraction and the ultra sound
machine. The EKG machine was utilized for identified heart
murmurs. A total of 720 prescriptions were filled for minor
ailments. Preventative medicine handouts on smoking
cessation, dental care, drug and alcohol abuse, sexually




The combined team consisted of twenty-six medical
personnel. Table 4-3 identifies the specialties of each
country's team members.
USAF 6th Medical Group Jordanian Royal
MacDill, AFB Medical Services
Internal Medicine, Commander Family Physician, Commander
Radiologist Family Physician (2)
Medical Administrator Opthamologist
Pediatrician Medical Supply Officer
Family Practice Physician Lab Technician (2)






Table 4-3 [Ref. 35]
5 . Observations
It must be reiterated that problems encountered on this
specific operation are not necessarily encountered on every
Medical HCA operation. These observations are presented to
demonstrate the types of problems encountered by U.S.
personnel in coordinating with the host country's medical
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team. The After Action report submitted by the U.S. team
commander stated that all objectives of the operation were
achieved and the operation was highly successful. The
success of the mission was based on objectives set in
predeployment planning correspondence and the opinion of the
U.S. team commander.
a. HCA Planning Problems
The team departed Shaw AFB and arrived at Marka
International Airport, Amman, Jordan. Because the
Jordanians thought the team was landing in Azraq, they were
not met by a Jordanian representative in Amman.
The Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) is used to
set the itinerary, and to establish billeting and travel
arrangements for the mission. The U.S. HCA team leader
attended only the initial PDSS in January 1996.
Upon arrival, the Jordanians did not have a clear
idea of a work plan, despite prior communications with the
HCA team. It was later determined that the Jordanians who
attended the PDSS in January, prior to the mission, were not
the same individuals who participated in the actual HCA
project. There was obviously poor communication between the
two Jordanian parties. A firm itinerary was never laid out
by the Jordanians, only vague ideas of when and where the
team could work. The Jordanians planned to have the HCA
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team work through 13 May 96 and depart on 14 May 96. This
was contrary to the earlier planned departure of 12 May 96.
This indicates that no matter how well the U.S.
team has planned before commencing the operation, the host
nation' s lack of coordination could cause problems and must
be anticipated.
b. Execution Problems
The U.S. team commander contracted severe diarrhea
on the sixth day of the operation. However, the team was
prepared and had the necessary medication for treatment. The
team noted that it is critical for team members to drink
bottled water and insist on it being provided if their own
stocks are depleted.
The Jordanians did not provide an adeguate truck
for the HCA team material. The team had to go to great
lengths to demonstrate they needed a larger vehicle, despite
earlier communication of the size and weight of the
equipment
.
The Jordanian team was annoyed by the U.S. team
insistence on taking the time to properly handle and package
their equipment each day after working. The Jordanians
displayed a nonchalant manner toward their own equipment and
supplies. Some of the Jordanians supplies were damaged by
their haphazard stowage in their truck.
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The hosts expected HCA team members to pass out small
gifts and toys to children. Also, the Jordanians were
offended that the team did not present them with a plaque at
the end of the mission.
The Jordanians did not supply enough interpreters.
Communication was difficult when English speaking Jordanian
doctors were not present.
Female members of the HCA team were not treated
equally to their male counterparts. The majority of the
Jordanian team, especially the enlisted men, treated the
U.S. female HCA team members with subservience. This
resulted in resentment by the female members toward the
Jordanians
.
Cultural differences must be briefed prior to
commencing an operation so that HCA team members are
prepared to deal with them.
The Jordanians were very concerned about how much
money they were going to receive and how much of their
equipment requests the team could accommodate. It appeared
that the Jordanians looked at the mission as a way to get
the $75,000 in medications earmarked for the operation, not
as a medically focused mission. A full 80 percent of the
material went to their clinic after the operation was
concluded [Ref. 34]. LtCol. Rodgers, the HCA team
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commander, stated, "the Jordanian Officers were rather up
front about it and were not as enthusiastic as the U.S. HCA
team members about providing medical care to the children"
[Ref . 34]
.
There were significant problems that were overcome
with determination by U.S. team members and the mission
achieved all stated objectives. All medical team members
must be briefed about these types of problems and understand
the cultural, logistical, and political realities in the
host country before commencing a medical HCA operation.
These potential problems can be overcome with
professionalism and a thorough understanding of the stated




Chapter five will provide an overview of what was found
in research. Section A will answer the main thesis question
and Section B will answer the subsidiary research questions.
Recommendations for further research will be presented in
Section C.
A. PRIMARY THESIS QUESTION: What Is the current structure
for planning, coordinating and budgeting for IH/DRO and
the use of DoD medical assets In these operations?
1. Planning IH/DRO
The primary entity responsible for planning and
executing IH/DRO is the Unified Combatant Command. The
Unified Commands that conduct IH/DRO are USCENTCOM, USECOM,
USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USACOM, and in some situations SOCOM.
With the exception of Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
,
each Unified Command is responsible for a geographic Area of
Responsibility or AOR.
When a mission is identified by the State Department,
the Unified Command tasked to execute the mission
establishes a Joint Task Force. This Joint Task Force
develops an OPLAN or Operation Plan that establishes mission
objectives and JTF component responsibilities. For example,
JTF 160 was established in 1994 to execute operation SEA
SIGNAL to handle the Cuban and Haitian migration crisis.




To clarify the AORs for the Unified Commands Figure 5-1
is provided. The AOR of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) is






















The coordination of IH/DRO was outlined in chapter III.
The major players conducting IH/DRO are the DoD, Department
of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
,
and its Office Of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) , the
host government, the United Nations, and NGOs
.
The usual progression of a IH/DRO mission is this:
a disaster occurs, the host country asks the U.S. ambassador
for assistance, and the ambassador declares that assistance
is required. The State Department will request DoD
assistance through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) . The DoD will activate a Humanitarian
Assistance Survey team to assess scope and extent of
disaster. The data is relayed to the Unified Command which
has responsibility over the geographic area of the disaster
site. The Unified Command establishes a Joint Task Force to
render assistance.
3. Budgeting for IH/DRO
The budgeting for Humanitarian Assistance has been and
will continue to be a problem into the foreseeable future.
The OHDACA appropriation identified in Chapter II is one
mechanism utilized to pay for HA operations. It is
exceedingly difficult to budget for operations when their
ocurrance and magnitude cannot be anticipated.
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Large scale IH/DROs rely on the movement of funds within
existing O&M accounts. If the operation is long in
duration, it has been necessary to ask for supplemental
appropriations or reprogramming of appropriated funds to
cover the costs.
B. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What IH/DRO have we conducted in the past utilizing
DoD medical assets and what were the results?
The research presented in Chapter II demonstrated that
the U.S. DoD has been conducting IH/DRO since before the
cold war era. We have conducted numerous operations in
providing disaster relief as a result of natural or manmade
disasters. Examples of these types of operations are in
Chapter II.
The Humanitarian Civic Action program had its
beginnings in the Korean War with the Armed Forces
Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. This was one of the
first nation building programs similar to HCA which is part
of the JCS Nation Assistance Program.
The success of past operations is hard to quantify. It
is very important to first identify objectives of the
operation in order to know they have been achieved and the
assets can be removed. This can be a problem, as
demonstrated in Operation Provide Comfort in Somalia.
Objectives were vague and mission creep lead to problems for
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the DoD personnel conducting the operation.
2. What are the current federal laws, military
doctrine, and interrelationships between government
agencies that coordinate and execute IH/DRO
involving medical assets?
There are various sections of Title 10 U.S. Code that
allow DoD participati n in IH/DRO. The most pertinent
sections are 401, 402, 2547, and 2551. A detailed review. of
these sections of Title 10 is provided in Chapter III.
Doctrine on IH/DRO is widely acknowledged to be
lacking. Two JCS pubs, 3-07 and 4-02, provide limited
doctrine for conducting IH/DRO. JCS Pub 3-07 is entitled
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and
JCS Pub 4-02 is entitled Doctrine for Health Services
Support in Joint Operations. The Naval Doctrine Command is
currently developing doctrine covering naval participation
in IH/DROs.
The complex web of interrelationships among U.S.
government agencies that conduct IH/DRO is reviewed in
detail in Chapter III.
The command relationships among U.S. government
agencies that coordinate to conduct IH/DRO can best be
represented as an inverted pyramid with the strategic level
on the top, the operational level in the middle, and the
tactical level at the bottom. The strategic level makes the
decision to proceed with the operation and scope of the
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proposed operation. The strategic level is made up of
Congress, the State Department, the National Command
Authority, the U.S. Agency for International Development in
its capacity as the President's coordinator of international
disaster assistance, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
.
The operational level is filled by the regional CINC
who is responsible for contingency planning in its Area of
Responsibility (AOR) . The regional Unified Command will
stand up a Joint Task Force (JTF) to execute the IH/DRO
after the strategic level has made a decision.
The tactical level, at the bottom layer of this
inverted pyramid, executes the operation. The Commander of
the Joint Task Force (CJTF) is responsible for the conduct
of U.S. forces in the theater of operation.
Agencies outside the U.S. government, and outside the
inverted pyramid model, add a greater degree of complexity
to the coordination of assets to conduct IH/DRO. These
outside agencies consist of coalition forces, the United
Nations, the host government, NGOs, and other participants
depending on the operation.
3 . How do we plan for contingencies that require the
use of medical assets at the Unified Command level
and how much does it cost?
There are no formal detailed contingency plans for each
type of IH/DRO mission. Each mission is inherently unique,
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resulting in ad hoc planning to suit the details of each
mission. A problem with this ad hoc planning is that
corporate knowledge is lost when personnel involved in these
operations rotate to other billets. It is the Unified
Commands' responsibility to maintain detailed lessons
learned so that errors are not repeated. The Joint Uniform
Lessons Learned System ( JULLS) , helps in this regard. This
question is addressed in detail in Chapter IV.
4. What are the current trends for the use of military
medical assets for IH/DRO?
DoD medical assets have been, and will continue to be a
vital component in conducting IH/DRO, whether they are
purely humanitarian disaster relief or Humanitarian Civic
Action (HCA) program operations.
Organizations such as the Center of Excellence in
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, Tripler
Army Medical Center, will significantly enhance the
capability and efficiency of units conducting IH/DRO. This
COE provides education, training, and research in these
types of operations. By consolidating professional expertise
and study of IH/DRO in one location, "corporate knowledge"
is aggregated and can be accessed by all commands that
conduct IH/DRO.
A recent development in medical Humanitarian Assistance
Programs involves the Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
.
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USSOCOM has proposed to develop Medical Humanitarian
Assistance programs for each Regional Combatant Unified
Command's authorized countries. This proposal was made at
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
Appropriation Conference on 15, May 1996 to the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian Assistance [Ref. 36]. USSOCOM requested that
OASD Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance provide
USCINCSOC $.5 Million under sections 2547 and 2552 of Title
10 to send Special Operations personnel to each regional
Unified Command and to host a HA Program Conference. The
team sent to the Unified Commands would develop a SOF
Medical Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) tailored for
each geographic region in accordance with the CINC
s
strategy.
This program can be used for SOF and conventional
medical teams to conduct HA projects. The team would
coordinate with the Country Team and host nation ministries
of Health and Defense. Following approval of the developed
plans by the Regional CINCS and USCINCSOC, they would be
forwarded to JCS and OSD for review. USSOCOM envisions




The planning and coordination for employment of DoD
medical assets in IH/DRO is in a constant state of evolution
and change. As outlined in Chapter I, the mission is likely
to grow and place a greater burden on the DoD' s diminishing
assets. We must have a thorough understanding of how we
coordinate and conduct IH/DRO and constantly strive for
improvement and efficiency in the conduct of these
operations
.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. What efficiencies could be gained by consolidation
of all DoD IH/DRO planning and operational control into one
joint command?
2. How could SOCCOM' s proposal to develop medical
Humanitarian Assistance programs for each regional Unified
Combatant Command help the DoD medical community prepare for
participation in IH/DRO?
3. How can the DoD medical community change current
training guidance to better prepare for participation in
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